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Experiencing tactile facial stimulation while seeing synchronous stimuli on the face
of another individual induces “enfacement,” i.e., the subjective illusory experience of
ownership of the other’s face (explicit measure) and the attribution of the others’ facial
features to one’s own face (implicit measure). Here we expanded previous knowledge
by investigating if the tendency to include the other into one’s own representation is
influenced by positive or negative interpersonal attitudes derived either from consolidated
socio-cultural stereotypes or from newly acquired, short-term individual interactions with
a specific person. To this aim, we tested in Caucasian white participants the enfacement
with a white and a black confederate, before and after an experimental procedure inducing
a positive or negative perception of each of them. The results show that the subjective
experience of enfacement with in- and out-group others before and after the manipulation
is similar. The bias in attributing other’s facial features to one’s own face after synchronous
stroking was, instead, dependent on whether the other person was positively perceived,
independently of his/her ethnicity. Thus, we show that realistic positive face-to-face
interactions are more effective than consolidated racial biases in influencing the strength
of self-attribution of another persons’ facial features in the context of multisensory
illusions. Results suggest that positive interpersonal interactions might powerfully change
the plasticity of self-other representations.
Keywords: enfacement illusion, multisensory integration, stereotype, racial bias, interpersonal perception, social
cognition
INTRODUCTION
The sense of bodily self is based on the integration of congruent
spatio-temporal multisensory information (Tsakiris, 2010) and is
thought to be fundamental for higher forms of self-identity and
consciousness (Gallagher, 2000).
Recent research has shown that the bodily self is much more
malleable than usually assumed since relatively simple interper-
sonal synchronous multisensory stimulation can blur perceptual
self-other boundaries. After experiencing tactile stimulation on
the body while observing similar synchronous stimuli on the
same body part of another individual, participants self attribute
the observed body parts (e.g., rubber hand illusion) (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998) or even the full body (Lenggenhager et al.,
2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Such illusory embodiment is
accompanied by physiological changes in the actual body, such
as lowered body temperature (Moseley et al., 2008; Salomon
et al., 2013), altered immunological responses (Barnsley et al.,
2011), variations in tactile and pain thresholds (Hänsel et al.,
2011). Moreover, the brain circuit coding anxiety and interocep-
tive awareness reacts to threats to the synchronously stimulated
body as when the person’s real hand is threatened (Ehrsson et al.,
2007). Furthermore, increasing evidence shows that the illusory
embodiment of a full body or a single body part might even alter
attitudes toward others, such as implicit racial biases (Farmer
et al., 2012; Peck et al., 2013).
Here, we focus on the face, since it is the most important
and distinctive feature of our own body and of personal iden-
tity. The face also relays crucial information about others’ mental
and emotional states, which are fundamental for both social
interactions and interpersonal perception (Todorov et al., 2013).
Recent research has shown that synchronous stroking of one’s
own and another person’s face causes illusory embodiment of the
face of the other person, an effect we named “enfacement” (Sforza
et al., 2010). In the synchronous stimulation condition, the sub-
jective feeling of ownership and referral of touch (explicit measure
of the illusion) is accompanied by self-attribution of the other
person’s facial features in self-recognition and self-other discrim-
ination tasks (implicit measure of the illusion) (see Tsakiris,
2008; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a,b). This
evidence led researchers to hypothesize that synchronous inter-
personal stimulation induces plastic changes in the self-face
representation (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a,b). Indeed, the
visual representation of one’s own face is built upon accumulat-
ing congruent multisensory experiences e.g., by matching one’s
sensorimotor experience with the sensorimotor behavior of the
object (the face) seen in a mirror (Rochat, 2003; Tsakiris, 2010;
Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). Thus, the detection of match-
ing multisensory stimuli between one’s own and another’s face
(placed in front of us) allows us to incorporate the facial features
of the other into our own self-face representation.
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Moreover, similarly to the rubber hand illusion, it has been
shown that experiencing synchronous interpersonal stimulation
with another person may also change interpersonal perception by
increasing closeness, attraction, and perceived similarity toward
that specific person (Paladino et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al.,
2012a).
Thus, previous literature suggests that self-representation is
inherently plastic, since experiencing multisensory congruence
with another person may blur perceptual self-other borders and
induce bodily (i.e., inclusion of other’s body) and conceptual (i.e.,
adoption of other’s attitudes and psychological traits) self-other
merging.
Here, we expanded previous knowledge by investigating if
the tendency to include the other into one’s own representa-
tion is influenced by positive or negative interpersonal attitudes
derived from consolidated socio-cultural stereotypes or from
newly acquired, short-term individual interactions.
For example, when approaching a new person, our behavior
is influenced by first sight impressions, social categorizations and
stereotypes that seem to be automatic and unavoidable (Cosmides
et al., 2003; Degner and Wentura, 2010). Among these, group
membership has shown to be a dominant factor (Brewer, 1979).
People show an in-group favoritism and out-group derogation
bias, i.e., tend to perceive the in-group members as more similar
and evaluate them more positive than out-group members (for a
review see Hewstone et al., 2002). Ethnicity is one of the strongest
factors for stereotyping (Stangor et al., 1992) and plays an impor-
tant role in various processes of overlapping self-other represen-
tations such as sensorimotor and affective resonance for others’
actions and sensations (Avenanti et al., 2010; Liew et al., 2011;
Azevedo et al., 2012), mimicry (Bourgeois and Hess, 2008), and
visual enhancement of touch (Serino et al., 2009; Fini et al., 2013).
Thus, we tested whether racial group membership may mod-
ulate enfacement and if this effect depends upon implicit and
explicit racial biases. To this aim, we measured implicit and
explicit racial attitudes of white Caucasian female participants
undergoing the enfacement paradigm [i.e., visuo-tactile syn-
chronous (illusory condition) and asynchronous (control con-
dition) stroking] with in-group (i.e., white) and out-group (i.e.,
black) partners (who were confederates of the experimenter). As
sensorimotor sharing is usually stronger among ingroup mem-
bers, we expected the enfacement to be stronger for ingroup (i.e.,
white) vs. outgroup (i.e., black) individuals.
However, despite the well-known influence of racial stereo-
types on various emotional and cognitive processes, short-term
interactions establishing a sense of connectedness between indi-
viduals maymediate interpersonal links and even overrule group-
based stereotypes (Kurzban et al., 2001). Connectedness also
increases mimicry (van Baaren et al., 2009) while felt likability
(Sobhani et al., 2012) intimacy (Mazzola et al., 2010), simi-
larity (Désy and Théoret, 2007) and perceived fairness (Singer
et al., 2006) of the observed person modulate activity in brain
regions that code for self and other’s actions, sensations, emo-
tions (Bufalari and Ionta, 2013) and motor behavior in dyadic
interactions (Sacheli et al., 2012).
Thus, we additionally addressed the question if experimen-
tally induced positive or negative interpersonal perception affects
the enfacement effect. To this aim, we adapted a paradigm that
has been previously shown to effectively change the interper-
sonal relationship toward a specific person (i.e., the self-esteem
threatening paradigm, Caprara et al., 1987; Sacheli et al., 2012).
We provided participants with manipulated false positive or neg-
ative feedback about the first impression the white and black
confederate gave of them. Thus, the enfacement strength was
compared before and after participants’ received the feedback.
We hypothesized that participants would exhibit stronger enface-
ment with the confederate who liked them (hereafter named
“positive partner”), and weaker enfacement with confederate who
disliked them (hereafter named “negative partner”), as indicated
by positive/negative first impression judgments.
Recent research demonstrates that manipulating social con-
text, cognitive strategies and intergroup relationships can dimin-
ish the extent to which race is encoded (Kurzban et al., 2001)
and modulate brain activity related to racial biases (Wheeler
and Fiske, 2005; Van Bavel et al., 2008; Sheng and Han, 2012).
We explored the link between these variables by testing whether
induced positive or negative perception of in-group vs. out-
group individuals may override any possible enfacement dif-
ferences driven by group membership. We hypothesized that
experimentally induced interpersonal perceptions could increase
facial embodiment of positive out-groupmembers and conversely
decrease facial embodiment of negative out-group members.
In order to ensure that the interpersonal manipulation was
effective in changing the perception of the confederates, we
measured the perceived attractiveness of the confederates before
and after the participants received the first impression feedback.
We expected that receiving positive vs. negative feedback would
respectively increase and decrease the perceived attractiveness of
the partner. This would be in keeping with social psychology and
neuroscience studies showing people tend to like those who like
them (Lowe andGoldstein, 1970; Aronson et al., 2010) and to per-
ceive people with favorable personality traits as more attractive
(Lewandowski et al., 2007).
Also, we tested whether inducing positive or negative interper-
sonal perception of specific in- and out-group members could
modify participants’ implicit racial attitudes toward the group the
confederate belonged to. To this aim, we administered the IAT not
only before but also after the interpersonal perception induction,
at the end of the whole experiment.
Thus, the present experimental set-up allowed us to explore, in
an ecologically valid but still well-controlled way, whether enface-
ment depended on positive vs. negative interpersonal perception,
either defined by established socio-cultural stereotypes or by the
momentary liking of the other persons.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-seven, normal or corrected-to-normal sighted Caucasian
females (M = 23.9 years, SD = 2.9) interacted with both a black
and a white female confederate. Because attractiveness plays a role
in the enfacement illusion (Sforza et al., 2010), the two confeder-
ates were selected on the basis of a preliminary study in which
an independent sample of female participants judged them as
equally attractive {paired t-test [T(9) = 1.854, p = 0.1]}. All the
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participants provided their informed consent. All were naïve to
the purpose of the study, debriefed and reimbursed for their par-
ticipation. The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee
and was conducted according to the Helsinki declaration.
GENERAL PROCEDURE
An overview of the general experimental procedure is provided
in Figure 1A. The study was composed of three different ses-
sions separated by about a week’s time. Participants performed
a preliminary session during which pictures of their face, the
race version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), and personal-
ity measures were taken. Following, there were two experimental
sessions in which the enfacement was induced with both the
black and white confederate before and after the interpersonal
perception was manipulated using the self-threatening paradigm
by Caprara et al. (1987). The experiment was run with E-Prime
software (v1.1, Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA)
on an IBM compatible computer.
Visual stimuli
Participants’ pictures were edited using Adobe Photoshop® 7.0
software to remove external features (hair, ears) and create a
uniform gray background. Then, pictures were separately mor-
phed with the black and white confederates’ faces using Abrasoft
FantaMorph® 4.0 software at steps of 2%, thus obtaining 50 indi-
vidual images from the morphing continuum (as in Sforza et al.,
2010), whose end points were the participant’s face and the other
white/black person’s face.
FIGURE 1 | Experimental procedure. (A) Illustration of the general
procedure, which was completed in three different sessions separated by
about a week’s time. Participants performed a preliminary session (where
their face pictures, IAT, and personality measures were taken) and two
experimental sessions during which the enfacement was induced with a
black and a white confederate before and after the interpersonal
perception was manipulated. (B) The enfacement paradigm included
synchronous (illusory condition) and asynchronous (control condition)
stroking of one’s own and a black or white partner’s face, each followed
by: (i) the self-other discrimination task (rating on a 0–100VAS how much
each of the 50 images extracted from the morphing continuum between
the self and other face was like their own face, with 0 = “not me at all”;
100 = “completely me”); and in random order: (ii) the attractiveness
rating; and (iii) the Illusion questionnaire. (C) To vary the interpersonal
perception in the second session, false-feedback about the first impression
of both the black and the white partner was given to the participants.
Depicted are the globally positive (orange) and negative feedback (brown)
on the ten bipolar adjectives-VAS ratings. One group of participants
received positive feedback from the white (WPF) and negative feedback
from the black (BNF) partner, the other group the opposite.
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Enfacement paradigm
Each experimental session consisted of two runs containing the
enfacement paradigm with a white or a black confederate, in
counterbalanced order (Figure 1B). Participants sat facing the
confederates about 150 cm apart wearing a rigid paper funnel
around the eyes, which blocked the lateral view of the exper-
imenter who touched participants’ cheeks with two identical
paintbrushes. Both confederates and participants were asked to
concentrate on the other person’s face while the two faces were
manually touched synchronously (illusory-condition) or asyn-
chronously (control-condition). Strokes and taps were made
irregular and unpredictable in order to enhance the illusion
(Mohan et al., 2012). In the synchronous condition, they were
given in exact spatial and temporal synchrony while in the asyn-
chronous condition a delay between the strokes on the two faces
was introduced. Stimulation type order was counterbalanced
across participants.
Explicit measure of the enfacement: self-report questionnaire on
the phenomenological experience. The subjective phenomeno-
logical experience of the illusion was investigated by asking
participants to fill out a questionnaire, adapted by Sforza et al.
(2010) from the first seminal study on the rubber hand illu-
sion (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). The questionnaire, filled out
at the end of each a/synchronous stroking block, consisted of
the following eight statements investigating specific perceptual
experiences:
STATEMENT 1: It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the
paintbrush in the location where I saw the other’s face touched.
STATEMENT 2: It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused
by the paintbrush touching the other’s face.
STATEMENT 3:I felt as if the other’s face was my face.
STATEMENT 4: It felt as if my face were drifting toward the
other’s face.
STATEMENT 5: It seemed as if I might havemore than one face.
STATEMENT 6: It seemed as if the touch I was feeling came
from somewhere between my own face and the other’s face.
STATEMENT 7: It appeared as if the other’s face were drifting
toward my own face.
STATEMENT 8: The other’s face began to resemble my own face,
in terms of shape, skin tone, or some other visual feature.
Items 1–3 and 8 describe the experience of the illusion in its com-
ponents of referred sensation, self-identification and similarity
with the observed face (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2012b). The other questions were the control
items (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998). Participants indicated their
response on a VAS ranging from completely false to completely
true.
Implicit measure of the enfacement: self-other discrimination
task. A sensitive measure of the self-other discrimination abil-
ity was used to tackle changes in the visual representation of the
self-face induced by the synchronous interpersonal multisensory
stimulation Self-attribution scores of self-other morphed faces
were used as an implicit measurement of the enfacement effect
(as in Sforza et al., 2010). Immediately after the visuo-tactile
stimulation, participants performed the self-other discrimination
task by rating on a 0–100 visual analog scale (VAS) how much
each morphed face on the screen was like their own face (0 =
“not me at all”; 100 = “completely me”). Each stroking type
was presented in two subsequent mini-blocks, each one contain-
ing 2minutes of stroking followed by self-other discrimination
of 25 images selected from the morphing continuum. A different
set of 25 images was presented in each of the two mini-blocks.
Images in each set were pseudo-randomly selected such that 2 or
3 images were selected from each morphing category (categories
were defined as intervals of 10% of morphing continuum).
Interpersonal manipulation
A cover story was used, telling participants that they were also
recruited for a study on first impressions. Following the self-
threatening paradigm (Caprara et al., 1987), at the end of the first
experimental session, we asked confederates and real participants
to judge howmuch ten bipolar adjectives described their partners.
At the beginning of the second experimental session, before the
confederates’ arrival, participants were shown what both confed-
erates said about them and were asked to express how much (on
a 0–100VAS, with 0 = “completely disagree” and 100 = “com-
pletely agree”) they agreed with the received evaluations. The
feedback was manipulated: one group received globally positive
feedback from the white confederate and negative feedback from
the black confederate (White Positive Feedback group), while
the other received the opposite pattern (Black Positive Feedback
group) (see Figure 1C, where adjectives used in the experiment
have been translated to English).
Measures of the effectiveness of the interpersonal manipulation:
attractiveness ratings
To check if perception of confederates changed after the inter-
personal manipulation, attractiveness ratings of the other were
collected (on a 0–100VAS, where 0 corresponded to “very low”
and 100 to “very high”) before and after the interpersonal manip-
ulation. Studies indicate that enfacement increases the enfaced
other’s perceived attractiveness, and is in turn influenced by it
(Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al.,
2012a). Therefore, we collected attractiveness ratings for each
testing session after each synchronous and asynchronous stroking
block.
Measures of the effectiveness of the interpersonal manipulation:
implicit and explicit racial biases
To check if participants’ implicit racial bias changed after the
interpersonal manipulation, the race version of the implicit asso-
ciation test (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998) was administered to
participants before and after the interpersonal manipulation, i.e.,
in the preliminary session (IAT-pre), and at end of the sec-
ond session (IAT-post). During the racial IAT participants were
asked to press as fast and accurate as possible the same but-
ton for certain faces (white or black) and words (positive or
negative). For example, participants had to press the same key
for white faces and positive adjectives in one condition and
the same key for black faces and positive adjective in the other
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(please see Supplementary Material for a complete description
of the IAT procedure). The implicit bias is calculated from
the differences in speed and accuracy between the pairing of
white faces with positive words, and black faces with nega-
tive words vs. the pairing of white face with negative words,
and black faces with positive words. We calculated the two IAT
scores using the algorithm recommended by Greenwald et al.
(2003), taking into account the average reduction of scores in
the second measurement. Greater racial bias in favor of white
is indicated by higher (greater than 0) IAT scores [i.e., longer
reaction times and lower accuracies in associating black faces, as
compared to white faces, with positive (compared to negative)
words].
Even if racial bias is more readily observed at an implicit level,
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Ito and Bartholow, 2009), we also checked
for the presence of explicit racial biases with an ad-hoc interview,
adapted from Avenanti et al. (2010). The nine questions and asso-
ciated subjective ratings (on 0–100VAS, with 0 = “completely
disagree” and 100= “completely agree”) are listed in Table 1.
Measures of participant empathic traits
Enfacement strength shows a positive correlation with empathic
traits (Sforza et al., 2010). Thus, to control for the possible
contribution of empathy to the hypothesized effects of ethnic-
ity/interpersonal manipulation on the enfacement, we measured
participants’ empathic traits. In the preliminary session, partici-
pants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), (Davis,
1980), a personality questionnaire comprising 28 items to be rated
on a five-point Likert scale. The IRI consists of four subscales that
measure different aspects of trait-reactivity to others. Specifically,
Fantasy Scale (FS) and Perspective Taking (PT) measure cogni-
tive empathy, while and Empathic Concern (EC), and Personal
Distress (PD) measure emotional empathy.
Manipulation check
Finally, to check if participants believed the cover story, before
debriefing they were asked to respond whether they believed the
first-impression was a real study and if they were either offended
or pleased by the negative and positive feedback (on 0–100VAS,
with 0=minimally, and 100=maximally).
DATA ANALYSES
Preliminary analyses
To exclude the possible influence of spurious factors on the
changes induced in the enfacement illusion by our indepen-
dent variables (ethnic in/out-group membership; induced pos-
itive/negative interpersonal perception), we ran a series of pre-
liminary analyses to ensure that the two groups did not differ in
variables that could play a role in the enfacement.
Racial biases. Statistical analyses confirmed that the two groups
(positive feedback from the black, positive feedback from the
white) did not initially differ in implicit (seeMain Results section)
racial bias. Also, their explicit racial biases (see Table 1 for items)
did not differ as shown by a 2× 9 mixed-model ANOVA (Social
Manipulation; Item) which revealed only a significant main
effect of the Item [F(8, 168) = 85.59, p < 0.000] but no signifi-
cant main effect of the Social Manipulation nor an interaction (all
F-values < 1.73, all ps > 0.094).
Empathy traits. Due to the known interaction between empathic
traits and enfacement strength (Sforza et al., 2010), we checked
that the two groups did not show differences on the IRI
questionnaire. A mixed-model 2× 4 ANOVA (Interpersonal
Manipulation; IRI subscales) confirmed the lack of differences,
since there was a main effect of the IRI subscales [F(3, 66) = 12.63,
p = 0.000; EC (21.08 ± 3.55), PD (13 ± 5.05), PT (18 ± 4.64),
FS (17.08 ± 4.77)] and no significant main effect of the interper-
sonal manipulation nor an interaction (all F-values < 1.31, all
ps > 0.265).
Reactions to the interpersonal manipulation. To ensure that
both groups equally believed the manipulation, a t-test com-
parison of the VAS scores indicating how much participants
believed the cover story was calculated. No significant difference
was found [T(22) = 1.42, p = 0.17]. Moreover, the two groups
felt equally offended and pleased from receiving the negative and
the positive feedback from both the white or the black confeder-
ate. A mixed model 2× 2 ANOVA [Interpersonal manipulation
(White Positive Feedback group; Black Positive Feedback group);
Items (“How much did you feel offended by the feedback?”;
Table 1 | The 9-items of the ad-hoc interview on explicit racial biases are shown below.
Questions Mean ± SD
Do you think that, even if Italians and Africans become friends, they will never feel completely at ease in their interactions? 7.96 (± 8.9)
Would you be bothered by the event that a member of your family has a child with physical features (e.g., color of the skin) different
from yours?
8.92 (± 20.05)
Do you think that Africans take jobs that Italians deserve? 10.08 (± 14.3)
Do you think that Africans and Italians are comparable in terms of their honesty? 71.77 (± 30)
Would you be keen to have an intimate relationship with an African? 72.88 (± 22.9)
Would you be against a member of your family married to an African of comparable economic status? 3.58 (± 5.1)
Would it be a problem for you to have an African boss? 7.81 (± 15.2)
Is your family of Italian origin? 94.88 (± 19.3)
Do you frequently meet African people (relatives, friends, or colleagues)? 49.12 (± 32.3)
Means and standard deviations are reported.
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“How much did you feel pleased by the feedback?”)] revealed
no significant main or interaction effect (all F-values < 2.52, all
ps > 0.127).
First impression ratings on confederates’ personality and attrac-
tiveness. The two groups perceived the two confederates similarly
both in terms of physical beauty (attractiveness) and of person-
ality traits (first impressions). Results of the statistical analysis
on perceived attractiveness as measured in the first session are
embedded in the Main Results section.
Results of the mixed model ANOVA 2× 2× 10 with Race and
Adjective as within subjects and Social Manipulation as between
subjects factors performed on the first impression ratings showed
that participants in the two groups similarly judged the black
and white confederates. There was only a main effect of the
Adjectives [F(2, 198) = 4.61, p < 0.000] but no other significant
main (all F-values < 1.32, all p-values > 0.263) or interaction (all
F-values < 1.73, all p-values > 0.084) effects.
Main Analyses
Manipulation check. First, we tested the efficacy of the interper-
sonal manipulation, e.g., how much participants believed they
were involved in a real interaction and were pleased and offended
from receiving positive and negative feedback from the white
and/or the black confederate. Participants’ scores of the three
manipulation check items were tested using one sample t-test
against a score of 50 (which corresponds to a “neither agree nor
disagree” judgment on the 0–100VAS scale).
Explicit measures of the enfacement (questionnaire items).
Subjective ratings were analyzed using mixed-design ANOVAs
with Interpersonal Manipulation (White Positive Feedback;
Black Positive Feedback) as between subjects factor and Race
(White; Black), Session (1st; 2nd), Stroking (Synchronous;
Asynchronous) and Item [only for the questionnaire ratings:
illusion-relevant (Q1–Q3, Q8), illusion-irrelevant (Q4–Q7)];
see e.g., Lenggenhager et al., 2012 for a similar approach) as
within-subjects factors. When a significant fourth-way interac-
tion was found, post-hoc ANOVAs were run separately for each
session.
Implicit measure of the enfacement (self-other discrimination
task). The whole set of 2% rating values of the morphed images
was fitted into a four-parameter sigmoid statistical model [which
was based on the Boltzmann equation: y0 = A1 − A2/[1 +
e(x− x0/dx)] + A2] for each subject and experimental condition.
Appropriateness of the model was demonstrated for all the con-
ditions at individual level (all Radj ≥ 0.361; ps < 0.01) and the
X0 values were extracted for each subject and condition. X0 value
corresponds to the physical percentage of self-other morph val-
ues on the abscissa when subjective ratings were 50% on the
ordinate. Three participants had X0 outlier values (±2.5 SD) in
one or more experimental conditions and were excluded from
all statistical analyses. Then, self-attribution indices (X0 values)
were analyzed using mixed-design ANOVAs with Interpersonal
Manipulation (White Positive Feedback; Black Positive Feedback)
as between subjects factor and Race (White; Black) Session (1st;
2nd), Stroking (Synchronous; Asynchronous) as within-subjects
factors. When a significant fourth-way interaction was found,
post-hoc ANOVAs were run separately for each session.
Attractiveness ratings. Attractiveness modulations as a function
of interpersonal manipulation, ethnic membership or enface-
ment, were tested with a 2× 2× 2× 2 ANOVA with between
subject factors Interpersonal Manipulation and within subjects
factors Race, Session, Stroking.
Implicit racial bias. Modulations of implicit racial biases
as due to the interpersonal manipulation were tested with
a 2× 2 [Interpersonal Manipulation and Time (pre-; post-
manipulation)] ANOVA performed on the IAT scores.
For all the above mentioned analyses, when significant main
or interaction effects were found, Duncan post-hoc comparisons
were used. All data were analyzed with STATISTICA 7 software
(StatSoft, Tulsa, OK, USA) and the significance level was set at
p = 0.05.
RESULTS
MAIN RESULTS
The interpersonal manipulation was effective and participants
believed the cover story
Agreement scores for the three manipulation check items were
significantly higher than 50, Indeed, participants believed the
first-impression study was real [“believability” scale: (93.82 ±
14.66) (mean ± SD), t(1, 23) = 14.646, p = 0.000]. Participants
also felt offended [(62.30 ± 26.53), t(1, 23) = 2.271, p = 0.033]
and pleased [(67.53 ± 32.87), t(1, 23) = 2.612, p = 0.016] by the
partner’s negative and positive judgments, since their scores were
significantly higher than 50, and with equal intensity [offended
vs. pleased: t(1, 23) = −0.695, p = 0.494].
Explicit and implicit measure of the enfacement effect
The explicit measure of the illusion: the enfacement strength
does not depend on the other’s ethnic membership and posi-
tive/negative perception. Results show the illusion was present
in both sessions and independently of ethnic membership and
interpersonal manipulation (Figure 2).
Results of the 2× 2× 2× 2× 2 ANOVA revealed a main
effect of Stroking [F(1, 22) = 17.53, p < 0.000, η
2
p = 0.444],
Item [F(1, 22) = 20.26, p < 0.000, η
2
p = 0.479], a significant
Stroking× Item interaction [F(1, 22) = 20.78, p < 0.000,
η
2
p = 0.486], a significant Race × Session × Interpersonal
Manipulation interaction [F(1, 22) = 8.52, p = 0.01, η
2
p = 0.279]
and a significant 4-way interaction of Interpersonal
Manipulation, Session, Race, and Stroking [F(1, 22) = 6.51,
p = 0.02, η2p = 0.228].
Then, results of the 2× 2× 2× 2 (Interpersonal
Manipulation; Race; Stroking; Item) post-hoc ANOVAs show that
there was a main effect of Item in both the first [F(1, 22) = 20.53,
p < 0.000, η2p = 0.483] and the second session [F(1, 22) = 14.75,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.401], a main effect of Stroking in both the
first [F(1, 22) = 16.54, p = 0.001, η
2
p = 0.429] and second session
[F(1, 22) = 11.13, p = 0.003, η
2
p = 0.336] and crucially also a
significant interaction between Item and Stroking in both the first
[F(1, 22) = 20.04, p = 0.000, η
2
p = 0.477] and the second session
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 102 | 6
Bufalari et al. Individual interpersonal relation defines enfacement
FIGURE 2 | Explicit measures of enfacement. At the explicit level,
participants reported higher scores after synchronous with respect
to asynchronous stroking only in the items describing the
experience of the illusion, in both sessions and independently of
group membership and interpersonal manipulation. Agreement scores
on a 0–100VAS scales are shown (mean ± SE). Results of the
significant 2-way interactions between Stroking and Questionnaire
Items are reported for the first (left panel) and second (right
panel) session. [Asterisks indicate significant differences (∗∗∗Stands
for p ≤ 0.001)].
[F(1, 22) = 12.73, p = 0.002, η
2
p = 0.366], with higher values
after synchronous compared with asynchronous stimulations
only in the illusion-related items [1st session: (53.11 ± 4.70) vs.
(28.41 ± 4.81), p < 0.000; 2nd session: (48.79 ± 3.43) vs. (29.89
± 5.03), p < 0.000; see Figure 2].
Furthermore, the ANOVA on the second session ratings
revealed a significant Interpersonal Manipulation × Race inter-
action [F(1, 22) = 12.16, p = 0.002, η
2
p = 0.356], with higher
scores for the white compared to the black found in the White
Positive Feedback group [white (35.01 ± 7.63), black (26.85
± 6.67), p = 0.002] but not in the Black Positive Feedback
group [white (33.89 ± 6.58), black (36.75 ± 5.96), p > 0.24].
This effect was absent in the first session [F(1, 22) = 0.28,
p = 0.603].
Implicit measure of the illusion: the enfacement strength
depends on receiving positive feedback from the other indepen-
dently of her group membership. Results of the 2× 2× 2× 2
ANOVA (Interpersonal Manipulation; Session; Race; Stroking)
revealed a significant main effect of Session [F(1, 22) = 7.48, p =
0.012, η2p = 0.254] and a 4-way interaction [F(1, 22) = 5.64, p =
0.027, η2p = 0.204].
The 2× 2× 2 (Race; Stroking; Interpersonal Manipulation)
post-hoc ANOVA of the first session did not reveal any significant
main or interaction effect (all F-values < 2.963, all ps > 0.099).
The 2× 2× 2 (Race; Stroking; Interpersonal Manipulation)
post-hoc ANOVA of the second session revealed a significant
3-way interaction [F(1, 22) = 15.16, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.408]
(Figure 3). Duncan post-hoc analyses showed stronger self-
attribution scores after synchronous vs. asynchronous stroking
for the white face in the White Positive Feedback group
[(51.08± 1.37) vs. (49.1 ± 1.31), p = 0.01], and for the black
face in the Black Positive Feedback group [(50.82 ± 1.60) vs.
(48.6 ± 1.50), p = 0.01]. Furthermore, synchronous stroking
of the white positive face led to higher self-attribution than
synchronous stroking of the black negative face [(49.39 ± 1.00),
p = 0.02] in the White Positive Feedback group. Similarly,
synchronous stroking of the black positive face led to higher
self-attribution than synchronous stroking of the white negative
face [(46.72 ± 1.68), p = 0.00] in the Black Positive Feedback
group. No significant differences emerged between synchronous
and asynchronous stroking for the white or the black face that
gave negative feedback (all ps > 0.12).
Perceived attractiveness increases after receiving a positive
feedback from the other independent of her race. 2× 2×
2× 2 ANOVA (Interpersonal Manipulation; Race; Session;
Stroking) confirmed that interpersonal manipulation and enface-
ment changed the perception of the confederates as predicted
(Figure 4).
We found overall higher attractiveness ratings after enface-
ment induction, as shown by the significant main effect of
Stroking [F(1, 22) = 6.42, p = 0.019, η
2
p = 0.226; synchronous
(63.13 ± 0.32) (mean ± SE), asynchronous (61.44 ± 0.27)]. We
also found a three-way interaction of InterpersonalManipulation,
Session and Race [F(1, 22) = 32.76, p < 0.000, η
2
p = 0.598]. Post-
hoc tests showed that attractiveness increased for the confederate
who gave positive feedback to the participants and decreased for
the confederate who gave a negative feedback, independent of her
ethnicity.
Indeed, the attractiveness of the white confederate increased
while attractiveness of the black decreased in the White Positive
Feedback group in the second compared to the first session
[White: (60.58 ± 7.32) vs. (75.62 ± 5.24), p = 0.005; Black:
(66.92 ± 5.29) vs. (54.27 ± 7.92), p = 0.016]. Similarly, in
the Black Positive Feedback group attractiveness of the black
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FIGURE 3 | Implicit measures of enfacement. At the implicit level,
the illusion was present as indexed by higher self-attribution scores
after the synchronous compared to the asynchronous condition only
for liked partners independently of their group membership. Results
of the significant 3-way interaction between interpersonal
manipulation, race, and stroking on X0 values (± SE) are shown.
Asterisks indicate significant differences (∗∗Stands for p ≤ 0.01;
∗Stands for p ≤ 0.05).
FIGURE 4 | Attractiveness ratings attributed to the partners.
Attractiveness ratings (on a 0–100VAS scale with 0 = “minimally attractive”
and 100 = “maximally attractive”) increased after participants received
positive feedback and decreased after they received negative feedback from
the partner, independently of their group membership. Results of the
significant 3-way interaction between Interpersonal Manipulation, Race and
Session are shown. Depicted are mean and standard errors. Asterisks
indicate significant differences (∗∗Stands for p ≤ 0.01; ∗Stands for p ≤ 0.05).
confederate increased, while attractiveness of the white decreased
[Black: (56.41 ± 7.49) vs. (68.77 ± 6.78), p = 0.045; White:
(63.09± 6.68) vs. (50.63± 7.32), p = 0.017]. Furthermore, in the
second session the white face was judged as more attractive than
the black face (p = 0.000) in the White Positive Feedback group,
and the black face was considered as more attractive than the
white face (p = 0.001) in the Black Positive Feedback group. No
such differences were found in the first session [White Positive
Feedback: white (60.58 ± 7.32), black (66.92 ± 5.29); Black
Positive Feedback: white (63.09 ± 6.68), black (58.41 ± 77.49);
all ps > 0.187], thus showing that participants belonging to
the two groups perceived the black and white confederates
as equally attractive before receiving the interpersonal
manipulation.
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Implicit racial bias does not vary after receiving interpersonal
manipulation. The induction of positive or negative perception
of the black confederate did not respectively decrease or increase
participants’ implicit racial bias. The 2× 2 ANOVA revealed no
significantmain or interaction effects (all F-values< 1.17, all ps>
0.29). It should be noted that participants’ mean pre-IAT D score
was 0.534 (SD = 0.326, range: 0.11–1.368) meaning that our
participants showed an implicit pro-white bias at the beginning
of the two following experimental sessions, with considerable
between-subjects variability.
DISCUSSION
Both neuroscientific and philosophical theories argue that the
sense of self is importantly anchored to the neural mechanisms
representing the body (Damasio, 1994; Berlucchi and Aglioti,
1997; Bermudez et al., 1998; Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Damasio
et al., 2000; Gallagher, 2000, 2005; Metzinger, 2003; Zahavi, 2005;
Legrand, 2007). Yet, evidence is rising that the bodily self is more
malleable than previously assumed and influenced by moment-
to-moment online integration of multisensory input (Carruthers,
2008). In line with this idea, empirical research has shown that
relatively simple multisensory stimulations can alter the sense of
self. It has been shown, for example, that another person’s bod-
ily features can be misattributed to one’s own bodily self (e.g.,
Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Tsakiris,
2008; Sforza et al., 2010), and also that perception of one’s own
body (in terms of form and size; Normand et al., 2011) and
consequently the size of the objects in the surrounding world
(van der Hoort et al., 2011; Banakou et al., 2013) may change
according to the form and size of the synchronously stimulated
virtual body.
Thus, the multisensory stimulation approach bears a unique
possibility to study the plasticity of the bodily self and its interac-
tion with social cognition. Importantly, self-other sensorimotor
sharing may be fundamentally linked to human social and proso-
cial behavior (Avenanti et al., 2010).
Despite the growing interest in understanding the bodily
representation of the self and others and its plasticity, very lit-
tle is known about how self-other merging with a real other
person shapes the social relationship between the two. Two
important studies revealed that self-other merging may influ-
ence the link between the self and other (Paladino et al.,
2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a). Our results show for the
first time how self-other merging is modulated by positive or
negative attitudes toward others. We specifically assessed and
manipulated attitudes defined by enrooted, group-based catego-
rization processes (i.e., ethnic in-/out-group membership) and,
on the other hand, attitudes defined by short-term, real-life
interactions.
Crucially, the present results, obtained through a well-
controlled but still ecologically valid experimental set-up, show
that the interpersonal perception derived from socio-cultural
biases does not influence the enfacement. Conversely, the percep-
tion based on individual interactions does. It is important to note,
that at an explicit, conscious level, white participants report to feel
the illusion similarly for both black and white confederates (both
before and after receiving a positive or negative feedback from
them). The more subtle implicit measure of enfacement reveals,
instead, that participants include in the visual representation of
their face, only the individual who provided a positive view of
their personality. The finding that implicit and explicit measures
of self-other confusions can be dissociated is in keeping with
previous studies (Rohde et al., 2011).
We believe that these findings bear important insights on the
interplay of sensorimotor sharing, self-other merging and social
cognition, which might be relevant for both neuroscience and
the broader social sciences. In particular, our results support the
notion that the bodily self-representation is not only formed and
maintained through one’s own personal and private experiences,
but is also plastically modulated by social variables.
INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO A DIFFERENT RACE (ETHNIC GROUP)
CAN STILL BE ENFACED
During social interactions, humans are extremely prone to cate-
gorize and divide others in a “us vs. them” fashion (Tajfel, 1981;
Amodio, 2008). Interestingly, people not only distinguish the oth-
ers from the self, but spontaneously classify others into in-groups
and out-groups, according to socially relevant categories, such
as race, age, gender as well as by first sight impressions, which
are generally automatic and unavoidable (Cosmides et al., 2003;
Degner and Wentura, 2010). Ethnicity represents a powerful,
salient and very fast (in the range of milliseconds) cue for group
membership, social categorization and evaluation, especially in
the absence of other affiliation factors (see Kurzban et al., 2001).
Behavioral and neuroimaging techniques have been employed
to investigate the role of groupmembership in modulating shared
bodily representations. These studies demonstrated that the eth-
nicity dimension plays an important role in several instances
of self-other representations (Bourgeois and Hess, 2008; Serino
et al., 2009; Avenanti et al., 2010; Liew et al., 2011; Azevedo
et al., 2012). Interestingly, a very recent study found that illusory
embodiment through multisensory stimulation might alter race-
specific effects on visual enhancement of touch depending on the
participant’s racial bias (Fini et al., 2013).
In view of this, we expected stronger enfacement effect for
the in-group members. Yet, contrary to our hypothesis, our data
indicate that both races were equally enfaced at the explicit level
(phenomenological experience of the illusion evaluated by using
the questionnaires from Sforza et al., 2010) and implicit level (self
attribution scores at the self-other discrimination task). This is
in line with findings from studies showing that black and white
hands or virtual bodies can be similarly included in the body rep-
resentation of white individuals (Farmer et al., 2012; Peck et al.,
2013). The fact that race does not influence enfacement may be
even more surprising since the face is seemingly most relevant
for one’s own and another person’s identity (Sforza et al., 2010)
and, in principle, is very relevant for distinguishing the self from
others, and in-group from out-group members.
However, we note that although robust, this finding cannot be
generalized to societal groups at large. The participants involved
in our study, for example, were all university students with mild
implicit in-group bias. It is entirely possible that participants with
extremely high racial bias and/or negative life-experiences with
out-group ethnic members could show different results.
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ENFACEMENT IS INFLUENCED BY THE PREVIOUS BEHAVIOR OF THE
INTERACTING PARTNER
While racial group membership did not influence the enface-
ment, positive/negative interpersonal perception linked to the
positive/negative evaluation of the person after a face-to-face
interaction, strongly influenced self-other merging at the implicit
level, as measured by self-attribution ratings. It has previously
been shown that experiencing the enfacement effect can affect
social perception by increasing perceived similarity (Paladino
et al., 2010). Yet, this is the first study showing the other side
of the coin, namely that the perception of the other person can
influence the enfacement effect. Persons who previously behaved
nicely toward the participants (by providing positive first impres-
sion judgments of them) are more readily enfaced, leading to
stronger self-other misattribution.
An influence of both positive and negative interpersonal per-
ception has been shown in several instances of self-other affective
and sensori-motor sharing (Singer et al., 2006; Désy and Théoret,
2007; Sacheli et al., 2012; Sobhani et al., 2012; for a review see
van Baaren et al., 2009; Bufalari and Ionta, 2013). We expand
this notion by showing that our vis-à-vis social perception of a
partner modulates also the notion of one’s own bodily borders. In
fact, interpersonal visuo-tactile synchronous stroking causes bod-
ily self-other merging, i.e., a misattribution of the other person’s
facial features to the self. Contrary to self-other sharing, self-other
merging seems to be modulated only by positive interpersonal
perception. An important difference between sensorimotor self-
other sharing (e.g., during empathy) and sensorimotor self-other
merging (as during the enfacement) may be at the basis of this
discrepancy. Sensorimotor self-other sharing sets the basis for
understanding the “other” and is possibly at the basis of prosocial
behavior (Singer and Lamm, 2009), but does not lead to self-other
misattribution. The self-other distinction remains indeed clear.
In contrast, self-other merging induced by interpersonal multi-
sensory synchronous stroking blurs the distinction between self
and others, and possibly changes the way we represent the self
(i.e., the self-face: Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a). While further
studies will be necessary to better explain why we enface only
others who are likable, we tentatively link this effect to a sort
of “self-defending” strategy, i.e., we only include likable features
in the representation of our self. Indeed, it is known that peo-
ple tend to think of themselves as having more positive qualities
and fewer negative qualities than others (Zuckerman, 1979; Taylor
and Brown, 1994; Shepperd et al., 2008) and show pervasive self-
serving biases in perceptual or cognitive processes to maintain
and protect positive self-views (Mezulis et al., 2004).
Overall, the fact that a simple multisensory integration-
related, short-lasting manipulation of interpersonal perception,
can alter bodily self-representations while race does not, sug-
gests that individual real-life interactions are more powerful than
automatic group-baseXd categorization processes (i.e., ethnic
in-/out-group membership). This result expands on previous
studies showing that situational interactions with a specific indi-
vidual are more important than established stereotypes and
categorization (Kurzban et al., 2001).
In this respect, the IAT results found in our study deserve
further discussion. We found that inducing positive/negative
perception of a given individual changed her attractiveness inde-
pendently on her ethnic group, but wasn’t able to change atti-
tudes toward the social group the confederate belonged to.
Note, however, that the IAT was administered at the end of
the second experimental session, after participants performed
a/synchronous stroking sessions with black and white confeder-
ates. Administering the IAT just one time instead of after each
stroking block was done to avoid possible learning effects due to
repeating the test too many times in a limited period of time. Very
recent studies showed that embodiment of black rubber hands
or virtual avatars may reduce the implicit racial attitudes toward
the out-group for white participants (Farmer et al., 2012; Peck
et al., 2013). Thus, we cannot exclude that the lack of a significant
change in the IAT scores may be due to the interfering effect of
a/synchronous stroking with black/white confederates.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our data suggest that at an explicit, subjective level,
we can enface even dissimilar, disliked, and unfamiliar oth-
ers. However, at a subtler, implicit level, the self-other merg-
ing depends on positive interpersonal perception derived from
individual-based interactions. Notably, the effect seems to be
at play not only for established positive perceptions (like those
derived from long term friendship; Sforza et al., 2010) but also
for experimentally induced momentary mutual liking. The fact
that even very short-lasting social interaction can influence the
amount of self-other merging suggests that social relationships
are highly relevant for moment-to-moment construction of a
bodily self and suggests that the plasticity of facial representation
is greater than previously believed.
Thus our results may pave the way for the development of
experimental paradigms for research on patients with defective
self-other interactions, such as those found in autism, avoidant
personality disorders and social phobias.
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